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THE JUDICIARY AT SEPARATION 
Separation of Queensland from New South Wales brought 
together the two most important and powerful men in the new 
colony. One was Sir George Bowen, "Captain-General and 
Governor-in-Chief of our said colony", whose proclamation at 
Brisbane on December 10, 1859 of the Letters Patent of June 6, 1859, 
marked the starting point of Queensland's existence.' The other was 
Alfred James Peter Lutwyche, Judge of the Supreme Court at 
Moreton Bay, who "robed and in an awful wig" as Nehemiah 
Bartley observed him,^ administered the oaths of office and allegiance 
to the Governor of Queen Victoria's most recent and remote colony. 
They were soon to share their powers with the legislature to be 
established in 1860 by elections for a Legislative Assembly. 
Mr Justice Lutwyche was not merely the only judge in Queensland; 
he was a Judge of a Supreme Court. As such his powers were exten-
sive and his hold on his judicial office virtually impregnable. The 
Governor was appointed and removable upon the advice of the 
Imperial Government, to whom he reported and was responsible. 
Hon. Mr Justice B. H. McPherson is a judge of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland. 
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In Queensland he acted upon the advice of his Executive Council. 
The Judge, who had been appointed by the Government of New 
South Wales, could be removed by Her Majesty upon address by 
both houses of the legislature. Neither house had yet been constituted 
in Queensland. The only other means of removing a colonial judge 
was by "amotion" under the Colonial Leave of Absence Act 1782 
for misconduct in office; but this procedure, which was subject to 
appeal to the Privy Council, was available only after definite charges 
had been laid against the judge and he had been heard in his defence. 
When in 1862 Governor Bowen had thoughts of invoking the Act 
against Lutwyche, he was advised by the Law Officers to the Crown 
in London that it was available only in the case of "legal and official 
misbehaviour and breach of duty", and not "any mere error of judg-
ment or wrongheadness consistent with the bona fide discharge of 
that duty". ' 
As Supreme Court judge the powers exercisable by Lutwyche J. 
were considerable. Under the Australian Courts Act 1828, he pos-
sessed all the judicial powers of the Lord Chancellor of England, 
as well as the entire range of jurisdiction, civil and criminal, vested 
in the superior courts of common law at Westminster. Both he and 
the Governor were equally subject to and bound by the law; but it 
was the Judge and not the Governor who decided what the law was. 
Although controlled by statute, by precedent, and by his professional 
training, Lutwyche, as the only judge, enjoyed a measure of inde-
pendence never since enjoyed by any judge in Queensland. His deci-
sions were, of course, subject to appeal, although at that time appeals 
were practically confined to matters of law. Before Separation, 
appeal lay to the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Sydney. 
The very fact of Separation changed all that, as decisions of 
Lutwyche J., of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and of 
the Privy Council, confirmed in 1860." Thereafter a litigant aggreived 
by a decision of Lutwyche J. could appeal only to the Supreme Court 
of Queensland, where he would find himself once more confronted 
by Lutwyche now sitting as the Supreme Court in Banc. His Honor 
was, as at his death Lilley C. J. acknowledged, readier than most 
men "willingly and cheerfully" to admit to error;' but it was Lilley 
who in 1860 had condemned this procedure as amounting to an 
appeal "from His Honor downstairs to His Honor upstairs." Beyond 
it there was always the Privy Council in London; but even after that 
right of appeal was fully established by Order in Council of June 
30, I860,' it required some patience, much determination, and a deep 
purse, to carry an appeal to London. It was not until 1876 that an 
appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland first reached the 
Judicial Committee.' Significantly, it involved a dispute over min-
ing claims on the Gympie goldfield. 
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MR JUSTICE LUTWYCHE 
Compared to the Governor, the position and powers of the single 
Supreme Court judge at Separation were therefore, relatively speak-
ing, unassailable. The personality, background and outlook of 
Lutwyche J. consequently assume a certain importance in the events 
that followed. In an earlier period of English history there had been 
another judge who bore the surname Lutwyche. Appointed to the 
Court of Common Pleas in 1686, Sir Edward Lutwyche was turned 
out of office for his Jacobite sympathies after the abdication of 
James 11 in 1688.' Thereafter he contented himself with completing, 
in Latin and law French, two volumes of reports of cases decided 
in the Common Pleas between 1684 and 1704.' It seems likely that 
the Queensland judge claimed descent from his earlier namesake. 
The Supreme Court Library at Brisbane includes in its collection of 
rare books an original edition of Sir Edward's reports presented by 
the executrix of Alfred Lutwyche after his death in 1880. 
If Alfred Lutwyche felt some pride in his judicial ancestry, he 
certainly did not inherit his pohtical views. Born into a well-to-
do family of London merchants,'" Lutwyche J. of Queensland 
typified the nineteenth century English liberal — one who, in the 
Orwellian vision, "is always fighting against something, but who 
fights in the open and is never frightened". In writing that, George 
Orwell had in mind Charles Dickens; and Dickens and Lutwyche 
are said to have been life-long friends, a circumstance dating from 
their days as Parliamentary reporters for the liberal Morning 
Chronicle. After admission to the Bar, Lutwyche maintained an 
interest in politics and the franchise by editing a series of reports 
devoted to decisions on registration of voters under the provisions 
of the Great Reform Act of 1832." Ill-health forced him to emigrate, 
and, after surviving a shipwreck on remote Amsterdam Island, of 
which he published accounts in both French and English,'^ he reached 
Sydney late in 1853. Abandoning a commission as Sydney reporter 
for the Chronicle, he was admitted to the colonial Bar, and soon 
became active in local politics, becoming in 1856 Solicitor-General, 
and in 1858 Attorney-General in the two Cowper ministries of that 
period. It was to this that he owed his appointment to the Supreme 
Court at Moreton Bay in February, 1859. 
New South Wales attained representative internal self-government 
under the Constitution Act of 1855. The franchise conferred by 
that Act was subject to a not insubstantial property-owning 
qualification. However, in 1858 the Cowper government secured the 
passing oi the Electoral Act 1858 extending the right to vote to male 
persons who had been resident in the electoral district for the 
preceding six months, or who satisfied a negligible property or 
income-earning test. Later, when the crisis erupted in Queensland, 
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Lutwyche was credited — debited might be more accurate — by his 
critics with responsibility for procuring the more liberal franchise 
in New South Wales, and with being associated with the "ultra-
democratic" portion of the press.'' Certainly in Queensland he liked 
to stress his early connexion with the press, forming a close associa-
tion with Theophilus Pugh, the editor of The Courier, reputedly a 
supporter of radical causes. 
ESTABLISHING A LEGISLATURE 
For the present account the relevance of these matters lies in the 
provisions of the Letters Patent and Order in Council, both dated 
June 6, 1859, by which Queensland was constituted and its govern-
ment provided for, which were pubhshed by Governor Bowen on 
or shortly after his arrival. The procedure for constituting the 
Legislature, consisting of an elected Assembly and a nominated 
Council, was laid down by the Order in Council, which also took 
effect on December 10, 1859. Arranging for elections to the Assembly 
was a task entrusted to the Governor of New South Wales, then Sir 
William Denison. Article 6 of the Order in Council required him 
to fix by proclamation the number of members of the Assembly; 
to divide the colony into convenient electoral districts; and to 
arrange — 
for the compilation and revision of lists of all persons qualified 
to vote, according, as nearly as may be, to the laws which now 
or shall be at the date of the Proclamation, in force in the Colony 
of New South Wales, at the elections to be holden within the several 
districts of the said colony [of Queensland]. 
Had art.6 of the Order in Council stood alone, no difficulty would 
have arisen in giving effect to its provisions. The New South Wales 
Electoral Act of 1858 had been assented to on November 17, 1858. 
According, therefore, to the laws in force in that colony at the date 
both of the Order in Council (June 6, 1859) and of Denison's Proc-
lamation (December 31, 1859)," those qualified to vote were the per-
sons specified in the Electoral Act of 1858. But art.6 did not stand 
alone. Article 8 expressly declared that the provisions of the New 
South Wales Constitution Act 1855 — 
"which relate to the constitution, functions and mode of proceeding 
of the . . . Legislative Assembly . . . and to the qualification and 
disqualification of electors and members of the Assembly, shall 
be of force within the said Colony of Queensland . . . and shall 
be deemed to be incorporated in the present Order in Council." 
The question was whether art.6 or art.8 prevailed. Depending on 
the answer, the extended franchise of 1858 or the more Umited fran-
chise of 1855 would govern the right to vote at Queensland's first 
election. 
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ADVICE OF STEPHEN C. J. 
The inconsistency between arts.6 and 8 was not adverted to until 
after the Order in Council reached Sydney on December 1, 1859. 
The explanation later given in the House of Lords by the Duke of 
Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, was that a copy 
of the Electoral Act 1858 had been received in London at the begin-
ning of 1859 but had "escaped the attention of the Government" 
at the time when the Order in Council was drafted in May 1859." 
Confronted with the inconsistency. Governor Denison sought the 
advice of the Chief Justice of New South Wales. The Governor seems 
to have entertained a hope that the extended franchise of 1858 would 
prevail;'* but the opinion given by Stephen C. J., with whom his 
colleagues on the New South Wales Bench "substantially con-
curred", was that the express provisions of art.8 were too "clear 
and precise" to admit of any qualification and overrode the appar-
ently contradictory provisions of art .6." The extended franchise in 
force in New South Wales was therefore not applied in the first elec-
tion for the Legislative Assembly in Queensland held in April, 1860. 
The incongruity of that state of affairs becomes more apparent when 
it is realised that in the last elections conducted shortly before Separa-
tion the voters of Moreton Bay had participated on the basis of the 
New South Wales electoral qualification of 1858. Now as 
Queenslanders some of them were disenfranchised in their own 
colony. 
These events raise a series of questions of historical and legal 
interest. One is whether Stephen C. J. was correct in his advice to 
Sir William Denison; and, if he was not, what consequences in law 
followed from his being wrong. As to the first question, the advice 
relied, as we have seen, primarily upon the specific form of art.8 
of the Order in Council. In his opinion Stephen C. J. acknowledged 
that, as a matter of grammatical form, art.6 required lists of voters 
to be compiled and revised of persons qualified to vote according, 
as nearly as may be, to the laws in force in New South Wales at the 
date of the Proclamation. He concluded, however, that this was a 
"clerical blunder" occasioned by the insertion of the words "accord-
ing as nearly as may be to the laws", etc. in the wrong place in art.6. 
His view was that they should have appeared directly under the 
phrase "compilation and revision of lists", and that they were 
intended to apply only to the creation of the machinery for the elec-
tions, not to the qualification for voting. "Is it not absurd", he 
asked — 
to suppose, moreover, that persons may be qualified as nearly as' 
may be according to law? What kind of quahfication would this 
give; and who could ever decide what degree of proximity to the 
established qualifications, short of the defined ones, would entitle 
a man to vote?" 
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Stephen's point may be shortly disposed of by reference to the pro-
visions of the \S5S Electoral Act itself. By s.9 of the Act, the entitle-
ment to vote was confined to the electoral district for which the voter 
was "qualified", either by residence, or by the possession or occupa-
tion of property in that district. Only in "such district" was a per-
son entitled to vote, the districts being identified by name in s.4 of 
the Act. Clearly a voting qualification expressed in that form in New 
South Wales could not be literally transposed to Queensland without 
some such modification as was both envisaged and authorised by 
the phrase "as nearly as may be". In other respects the defined 
qualification could, without resort to degree or proximity, quite 
readily be applied to the conditions of Queensland. 
In considering the question placed before him. Sir Alfred Stephen 
had confined his attention to the provisions of the Order in Council. 
On that limited basis, his opinion was, as Lutwyche himself 
acknowledged, supportable and very probably correct. The Chief 
Justice failed, however, to consider the provisions of the New South 
Wales Constitution Act 1855 which had authorised the Letters Patent 
and Order in Council. In providing for the erection of a separate 
colony in the north, s.7 of that Act empowered Her Majesty by those 
instruments — 
to make provision for the government of any such colony and for 
the establishment of a legislature therein in manner as nearly 
resembling the form of government and legislature which shall be 
at such time established in New South Wales as the circumstances 
of the colony will allow . . . [Italics supplied]. 
The Order in Council by which a legislature for Queensland was to 
be established at Separation was a form of delegated or subordinate 
legislation. As such it was subject to a well settled legal rule which 
confined its operation to the limits imposed by the Act conferring 
the power to make it. Section 7 of the Constitution Act spoke of 
the "establishment" of a legislature in manner resembling the 
legislature of New South Wales. In that colony one of the Houses 
of the Legislature was an Assembly made up of elected represen-
tatives of the districts identified in s.4 of the Electoral Act 1858. There 
could be no "establishment" of a Legislative Assembly in 
Queensland without an election. When, therefore, s.7 of the 
Constitution Act required that, as part of the legislature, the 
Assembly be established "in manner as nearly resembling the form 
of" the New South Wales Assembly at the time of Separation, it 
necessarily envisaged a process of election of members of the 
Assembly. It was only by such an election that this component of 
the legislature of Queensland could be established. 
Section 7 was, it is true, not happily worded; but it is difficult 
to resist the conclusion that the "manner" of establishing the 
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Queensland Legislative Assembly in the New South Wales form 
directly incorporated the criteria for determining who was entitled 
to vote at the elections held to establish it. To the extent that art.8 
of the Order in Council diverged from the authority conferred by 
s.7, it was ultra vires the New South Wales Constitution Act and 
accordingly of no legal effect or validity. 
THE OPINION OF LUTWYCHE J. 
It is unfortunate that the apparently informal instructions given 
to Stephen C. J. failed to canvass this point. It was not long before 
the penetrating gaze of Lutwyche J. brought it to light. As early as 
January 9, 1860, he wrote" to Governor Bowen advising his "dis-
sent from the views taken by Sir Alfred [Stephen] and his col-
leagues". The question, he said, went much deeper than the con-
struction of the Order in Council, and was whether art.8 "pursued" 
the authority given by the Constitution Act which it recited. Con-
cluding that it did not, Lutwyche added that, if no election had been 
held in Moreton Bay under the Electoral Act of 1858, "there might 
have been some room for argument founded on a difference of cir-
cumstances in the two colonies"; but, as the constituencies had been 
actually voted under the extended franchise, art.8 of the Order in 
Council was null and void. Accordingly, by art.20, which continued 
until repealed all New South Wales statutes applying in Queensland 
at Separation, the provisions of the Electoral Act were maintained 
in force in Queensland.^" 
The logic of the Judge's reasoning is difficult to refute. Its con-
sequences might be less certain. In quantitative terms, Bowen's initial 
estimate in his despatch to the Colonial Office of February 3, 1860 '^ 
was that a third of Queensland's voters had been disenfranchised 
as a result of adopting the 1855 electoral qualification. By the end 
of 1860 his estimate had been revised downward to a mere 1.5"7o, 
a figure that appears — in language which is unmistakably that of 
Bowen — in a prefatory Report to the Queensland Blue Book of 
I860." If the result of adopting the more limited franchise of 1855 
was — as is surely must have been — to exclude at least some voters 
from the roll in every constituency at Queensland's first election, 
then it follows that no members at all were validly returned to the 
Legislative Assembly of the first Parliament in 1860. On that footing, 
the Assembly, and consequently Parliament itself, as well as any 
subsequent Parliaments elected in the same manner, would never 
have been validly constituted or established. The acts of such a body 
could have no more validity or effect as legislation or binding law 
in Queensland than those of any collection of individuals who, 
without authority in law, might attempt to usurp the title and powers 
of the Parliament of Queensland. The Court would have been bound 
to deny effect to such an unauthorised attempt at law making. Even 
under the Parliamentary "despotism", as Professor A. H. Dicey has 
described it, prevailing in England, the courts are bound to regard 
only what is enacted by Parliament. That was settled in 1839 by the 
decision in Stockdale v. Hansard," when the Court of Queen's Bench 
rejected a claim to legislate by simple resolution of the House of 
Commons. In the United Kingdom, so the Court held, an Act of 
Parliament required the concurrence of all three "legislative estates" 
of which the British Parliament is constituted. In Queensland one 
of the three components had not been validly constituted. 
SUPREME COURT CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT BILL 1860 
It was some months before Lutwyche carried his reasoning to its 
final conclusion. What prompted him to do so was the progress 
through the Legislature of the Supreme Court Constitution Amend-
ment Bill. The principal purpose of the Bill was to reconstitute as 
the Supreme Court of Queensland what was, at least nominally, still 
the Supreme Court at Moreton Bay established by New South Wales 
legislation of 1857; but it also contained a provision cancelling the 
Judge's existing New South Wales judicial commission and 
substituting a local version, at a salary reduced from £2000 p.a. to 
£1200 p.a. For reasons at once both constitutional and personal, 
judges are extremely sensitive about attempts to tamper with their 
salaries. Lutwyche advised the Governor on July 20, 1860" that he 
would not accept a new commission under the proposed enactment 
for fear that he would lose his existing New South Wales commis-
sion carrying the higher salary and retiring allowance. He would, 
he said, take every preliminary step to prevent the passing of the 
Bill including "memorialising" the Queen to disallow it "on the 
ground that the Legislature itself is not legally constituted''^^ for the 
reason that the Order in Council had failed to follow, in respect of 
the qualification of electors, the conditions prescribed by s.7 of the 
Constitution Act 1855. In an evident reference to his letter of January 
7, 1860, Lutwyche went on" — 
I am glad that 1 pointed out this blot before any question about 
my salary arose. The Colonial Office probably set little store by 
the opinion of a Colonial Judge, but the opinion of the Crown 
Law Officer in England, issued before the Order in Council was 
made, was to the same effect, and unless some Imperial Act should 
be passed, legalising the Acts of this Legislative in the meantime, 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will, some fine day, 
set Queensland aghast. I believe that the Acts of this Legislature 
will not be worth the paper they are printed on, unless the Imperial 
Parliament interposes. 
That Lutwyche was fully conscious of the seriousness of the view 
he was propounding is shown by his assurance to the Governor that, 
"as the mere hint of such a doctrine would be sure to produce in-
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finite confusion", he would take care to keep it to himself and would 
transcribe the memorial to the Queen in his own hand, rather than 
have it written out by his clerk-associate. 
In due course the petition to Queen Victoria was prepared by 
Lutwyche and transmitted by Governor Bowen to the Colonial Of-
fice. In it, he submitted, as he had said he would, that the Legislative 
Assembly of Queensland was "illegally constituted, and consequently 
cannot, according to law, take part in the making of the laws." The 
petition accompanied the Governor's Despatch dated October 4, 
I860" enclosing a copy of the Supreme Court Bill, which had been 
reserved by the Governor for signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. 
After that, there was little to be done but wait for the Colonial Office 
response. The Judge found employment during the interval in an 
acrimonious correspondence with the Government. 
The long-awaited despatch from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies^* reached Queensland in April, 1861. While not question-
ing the legal competency of the Legislature to reduce the Judge's 
salary, the Secretary of State found himself unable to recommend 
for the sanction of Her Majesty the Supreme Court Constitution 
Amendment Bill, which appeared to him "open to much objection". 
In his despatch to Governor Bowen, the Duke of Newcastle expressed 
the hope that the Legislature would be led to a conclusion "more 
favourable to the claims of the present Judge". 
The arrival of the despatch in Queensland was marked by expres-
sions of widespread popular support for the Judge. Public meetings 
were held in the major towns followed by presentation to the 
Legislature of petitions signed by hundreds of citizens of Brisbane, 
Ipswich, and Toowoomba declaring their confidence in Mr Justice 
Lutwyche and urging his retention in office.^' To this, the Judge 
responded in characteristic vein, announcing his determination not 
to swerve from "the broad and plain path of duty, but to stand 
between the people and the Crown, and do justice to both." 
R. V. Pugh 
For a Legislature, now condemned to the humilation of having 
to re-enact the Supreme Court Amendment Bill shorn of its offend-
ing reduction in judicial salary, this was altogether too much to 
swallow. Among its members there were those who believed that the 
public meetings in support of Lutwyche had consisted of "personal 
friends and political partizans", and had been "secretly organised 
and arranged by Mr Justice Lutwyche himself".'" Re-submission of 
the Bill presented an opportunity for the Legislative Council to record 
their condemnation of the conduct of the Judge for, as they claimed, 
"practically evincing a political partizanship calculated seriously to 
impair confidence in the administration of justice in'the colony" and 
for "impugning the legality of the Constitution and Acts of the 
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Parliament of Queensland"." The Courier, whose editor T. P. Pugh 
remained a close friend and admirer of the Judge, retaliated in its 
issue of July 30, 1861 with an editorial attacking the Legislative 
Council for, among other failings, being "destitute of the gentle-
manly feelings"; lacking "common Christian charity"; evincing 
"utter disregard for the truth"; and having a "most crass ignorance 
on all matters". For the Legislative Council, this was the last straw, 
and Attorney-General RatcHffe Pring was prevailed upon to institute 
criminal proceedings for seditious libel against both Pugh, the editor, 
and Stevens, the proprietor, of The Courier. 
The trial of i?. v. Pugh on August 21, 1861" raised a number of 
points of legal and constitutional interest. Among them was the cir-
cumstance that the prosecution had its origin in criticisms of the 
Judge who tried it. There were even those who believed that 
Lutwyche himself had written the editorial in The Courier. He was 
said to have been seen at the office of the newspaper on the day 
preceding publication." As the only Supreme Court judge in 
Queensland, he alone possessed authority in the colony to conduct 
the trial. Describing his position as "very invidious", Lutwyche 
nevertheless declared that he would endeavour to fulfil his duty "in 
such manner as to leave as little occasion as possible for unfavourable 
comment"." At the outset, the defendant, represented by Mr Gore 
Jones of counsel, until recently the Supreme Court Registrar, entered 
a plea to the jurisdiction, submitting that Lutwyche J. had accepted, 
and was acting under, a commission issued pursuant to the recently 
enacted Supreme Court Constitution Amendment Act 1861.'^ Both 
the Act and the commission were, counsel submitted, invahd as hav-
ing been passed by a Parliament that was illegally constituted, con-
sisting as it did in part of a Legislative Assembly elected by persons 
qualified in accordance with the New South Wales franchise of 1855 
rather than that of 1858." 
Counsel's submission repeated what Lutwyche had been saying 
ever since January 1860. He had originally endeavoured to confine 
knowledge of it to the Governor. Inevitably it had become public, 
apparently at some time earlier in 1861, and certainly well before 
August 7, when Sir George Bowen advised Parliament of his assent 
to the revised Supreme Court Bill. In his message to the Assembly 
on that occasion," the Governor noted that, while agreeing to accept 
a commission under the new Act, Lutwyche had nevertheless intim-
ated his intention of again petitioning the Queen on the ground that 
the Legislature was illegally constituted. After receiving his commis-
sion on August 13, Lutwyche had taken the oath of office on the 
following day.^* A day later he received the congratulations of the 
Bar at a ceremony in Court at which the Attorney-General expressed 
delight at seeing him still in office and greeted him as "the first Judge 
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of Queensland"." His conduct in accepting the Queensland com-
mission while continuing to impugn its validity was thought by his 
critics to expose the Judge to charges of inconsistency. As always, 
he had a ready rejoinder. The Supreme Court Constitution Amend-
ment Act 1861 did, it was true, affect to cancel his New South Wales 
commission and to issue a new Queensland commission in its place; 
and, if it was invalid, so was the Queensland commission. But, if 
that Act was invalid, it necessarily also failed in its other purpose 
of cancelling his earlier New South Wales commission, which, by 
remaining in force, enabled him to preside as judge at the trial of 
R. V. Pugh. With that difficulty out of the way,''" the trial proceeded 
to a triumphant verdict of acquittal, greeted, as The Courier 
reported, by "one loud cheer" from a large and attentive audience 
in court. 
THE LEGISLATURE HELD INVALID 
In R. V. Pugh on August 21, 1861, Lutwyche avoided deciding 
whether the Legislature was invalidly constituted. It is possible he 
refrained from doing so because of his involvement in the matter 
that had brought the case to court; but, because of his conclusion 
about the validity of his commission, the occasion was not one on 
which he was bound to decide the question. He may have preferred 
to postpone it until he sat formally as the Supreme Court, rather 
than simply as a Judge presiding at a criminal trial, so that there 
would be a right of appeal to the Privy Council. The moment arrived 
three days later on August 24, 1861, when the Judge constituted the 
Supreme Court in Banc at the opening of the third law term of the 
year. The Attorney-General applied to fix the amount of security 
to be given by the Official Assignee "under the Supreme Court Bill 
lately passed." The fate of the application appears from the report 
in The Courier of August 24, 1861,"' which is as follows — 
The Judge said, in the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, 
and in his own opinion, the Supreme Court Bill was illegal, as hav-
ing been passed by a legislature improperly constituted. The 
Attorney-General had admitted this himself, by demurring to Mr. 
Jones' plea in the case of the Queen against Pugh, and until the 
Bill passed by the Imperial Parliament, legalising the proceedings 
of the Queensland legislature, was in the colony, he could not hold 
any other opinion than he did. 
The Attorney-General's response was that the Bill legalising the pro-
ceedings retrospectively had been passed a third time in the House 
of Commons on 20th of June last, to which he added an expression 
of hope that "the Queen would (sic) assent to it early enough in July 
to enable us to have it by the next mail." 
The Official Assignee's security was a requirement of the Supreme 
Court Constitution Amendment Act of 1861. The Court's refusal. 
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for the reason stated, to fix it under that Act therefore amounted 
to a direct decision by Lutwyche J. that the Queensland Parliament 
was not validly constituted. A necessary incident of the decision was 
that the Supreme Court Act and, by implication, all other Acts of 
the Queensland Legislature were invalid. 
AUSTRALIAN COLONIES ACT 1861 
At the time the Judge gave his decision it had, without his being 
aware of it, already been overtaken by events in England. The advice 
he had given in his letter of July 20, 1860 had with commendable 
speed been acted upon in the Australian Colonies Act 1861," which 
became law upon receiving Royal assent on July 22, 1861. Its effect 
— although no one in Queensland knew of it at that time — was 
to validate the Legislature and all its Acts, thus technically depriv-
ing Queensland of the distinction of being the first and, so far as 
can be gathered, the only colony of Empire to have its Parliament 
nullified by the decision of its own Supreme Court. 
The Imperial legislation averted that consequence and it did so 
retrospectively; but it does not dispose of the question whether, 
before the Australian Colonies Act was assented to on July 22, 1861, 
the Parliament of Queensland was improperly constituted and 
invalid. Lutwyche's reasons for thinking that it was have already 
been considered. It is known that the legal advisers to the Colonial 
Office agreed with his views. In his memorandum dated July 20, 
1860" Lutwyche had referred to an opinion of the Crown Law 
Officers in England given even before the Order in Council of June 
6, 1859 was made. No early opinion to the effect has so far been 
located. If it existed, one would expect that, as Attorney-General, 
Ratcliffe Pring would have known about it. When on August 24, 
1861, Lutwyche referred to "the opinion of the Law Officers of the 
Crown" as being at one with his own he was, however, almost cer-
tainly referring to an opinion given by them some time after his peti-
tion to disallow the Supreme Court Act had reached England either 
late in 1860 or early in 1861. In the course of the second reading 
debate in the House of Lords of the Bill that became the Australian 
Colonies Act 1861, the Duke of Newcastle referred to the opinion 
of "the principal Judge of Queensland" that "the powers and acts 
of the Legislative Council (sic) of Queensland were invalid".'"' He 
added that the Judge's opinion "was confirmed by the Law Officers 
of the Crown in this country". The date of this statement was March 
21, 1861, which would have allowed ample time for Hansard or 
newspaper reports of the debate to reach Queensland by August 24, 
1861. By that date both Lutwyche J. and Pring A.-G. were aware 
that the Bill initiated in the Lords had passed its third reading in 
the Commons. It is surprising that the Attorney-General should not 
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have been aware of the Crown Law Officers' Opinion when he in-
stituted the proceedings in R. v. Pugh; but when he applied to fix 
the Official Assignee's security on that date in August 1861 he 
claimed not to have heard of it." Lutwyche himself apparently had 
become acquainted with it only at some time between August 7 and 
August 24. 
The views held by Lutwyche J. are also supported by the form 
of the Imperial legislation. Section 4 of the Australian Colonies Act 
repealed so much of s.7 of the New South Wales Constitution Act 
1855 as required that the Legislature of the new colony in the north 
be established "in manner as nearly resembling the form" of the 
New South Wales legislature, which is the italicized portion of s.7 
quoted earlier. It was this provision that, according to Lutwyche, 
art.8 of the Separation Order in Council had failed to follow. In 
addition, s.3 of the Imperial Act deemed all the provisions of the 
Letters Patent and Order in Council to have been "valid and effec-
tual for all purposes whatsoever", thus disposing of the argument 
that, as delegated legislation, the limits of the power conferred by 
s.7 had been exceeded. Finally, the same section of the Imperial Act 
attributed to all the acts and proceedings of government and 
legislature the same force and effect as if the Order in Council had 
"in all respects been valid and free from doubt". 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
These events vindicate the Judge's consistent opinion that art.8 
of the Order in Council, and the electoral franchise adopted at the 
first election in 1860, were neither authorised nor valid. It is not to 
the point that at the time, according to Governor Bowen, all others 
held a different opinion of the implications of those defects with 
respect to the validity of the Queensland Parliament and the statues 
it enacted. It has always been difficult for lawyers, particularly those 
versed only in British constitutional law and history, to come to grips 
with the conception of a Parliamentary enactment being invalid. The 
constitutional position in the United States is quite different and was 
well known to lawyers in Australia in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Barely a month before Lutwyche J. was confronted with the problem 
in Queensland, the Sydney Morning Herald"^ had carried a report 
of the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Rusdon 
V. Weekes,"'' in which three judges of that Court were unanimous 
in concluding that there was power to hold a colonial enactment 
invalid if it exceeded the constitutional authority conferred upon it 
by Imperial enactment. In doing so, two of their Honours found 
it useful to invoke the analogy of the United States constitution. 
The question that arose in Queensland in 1861 was a more fun-
damental and far-reaching one. It was whether a court could and 
would declare invalid not merely a single Act of the legislature but 
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the entire law-making body itself. The notion that Parliament itself 
might be defectively constituted and legally inoperative is breath-
taking in its implications; but it was not unheard of in that period 
of Australia's history. At about the same time in South Australia 
Mr Justice Boothby was arriving at a similar conclusion, although 
extra-judicially, concerning the legislature in that colony. There the 
problem stemmed from the omission to reserve the South Australian 
Constitution Act 1855-1856 for signification of Her Majesty's 
pleasure as required by Imperial statute." The Law Officers sup-
ported Boothby's opinion, but he was condemned for it then, and, 
despite persuasive efforts by Mr P. A. Howell," he continues to be 
condemned for it in orthodox Australian histories.'" 
There are, indeed, some striking parallels between events of the 
time in Queensland and South Australia. In both colonies it was the 
opinion of a Supreme Court Judge that the local legislature was in-
validly constituted. In both cases the judge's opinion was upheld by 
a quite independent source, in the form of advice from the Law 
Officers to the Crown in London. In both colonies, the problem was 
capable of being solved, and was solved, only by the overriding force 
of Imperial Legislation. In both the judge's opinion provoked hostile 
reaction from government and legislature. In Queensland Lutwyche 
J. was condemned by resolution of the Legislative Council, and the 
newspaper editor who supported him was prosecuted for sedition. 
Procedures for removing him from office were investigated, and in 
1863 he was denied appointment to the newly created position of 
Chief Justice, an office which had been the object both of his ambi-
tion and his reasonable expectations when in 1859 he accepted 
appointment to what his predecessor Samuel Milford described as 
a "torrid Siberia".*' In the case of Boothby, the consequences were, 
in the end, far more serious. Early attempts to remove him from 
office by Parliamentary address were unsuccessful because, as the 
Law Officers pointed out, such an address was required to emanate 
from a lawfully constituted Parliament," and the validity of the 
South Australian legislature was itself open to question. Boothby 
was eventually "amoved" from office by the Governor acting under 
the Colonial Leave of Absence Act 1782. He died before his appeal 
could be heard by the Privy Council. 
In Queensland the success of Lutwyche against the combined 
forces of the legislature and executive was exceedingly short-lived. 
It ended with the enactment, in accordance with his advice, of the 
Australian Colonies Act 1861, which settled the franchise question 
in favour of the more restricted qualification, which thereafter con-
tinued to prevail in Queensland until 1872. The decision 60 years 
later in McCawley v. The King" adopting the British conception of 
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Parliamentary supremacy spelt an end to the possibility that legisla-
tion might be held invalid on grounds of inconsistency with the State 
constitution. An improperly constituted Parliament perhaps remains 
a theoretical possibility;" but it is extremely improbable that any 
judge in Queensland will ever again be called upon to declare Parlia-
ment to be invalid on that ground. Unlike Lutwyche J., no 
Queensland judge now has a New South Wales commission to fall 
back on to give him the jurisdiction necessary to decide the ques-
tion. All State Supreme Court judges now hold office under the 
authority of the Queensland Parliament. The decision of Lutwyche 
J. in 1861 was therefore not merely the first but almost certainly 
the last and only instance of its kind in the history of the law. 
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